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    Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie, United States District Judge for the Middle District of*
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 06-5058
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY JONES
                             Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00001-2E)
District Judge: Hon. Sean J. McLaughlin
__________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 30, 2007
Before: RENDELL and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges,
and VANASKIE , District Judge*
(Filed: January 17, 2008)
                     
OPINION
__________
VANASKIE, District Judge.
2Anthony Jones (“Jones”) appeals from his sentence of 292 months imprisonment
imposed by the District Court following Jones’s plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base and cocaine.  Jones pled
guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement in which he waived his right to appeal the
sentence.  Jones argues that the waiver is invalid, that its enforcement will result in a
miscarriage of justice, and, therefore, that this Court should disregard the waiver and
review the merits of his appeal.  We disagree, and hold the waiver valid and enforceable,
thus precluding consideration of the substantive issues presented by Jones’s appeal. 
Consequently, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
On January 10, 2006, a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania indicted
Jones and eight others on conspiracy and drug distribution charges.  Jones and the
Government subsequently negotiated and executed a written plea agreement in which
Jones agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy charge.  Of import to this appeal is
Paragraph A(8) of the agreement, which states that Jones “waives the right to take a direct
appeal from his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or 18 U.S.C. § 3742.” 
(App. 17.)  The waiver was subject to two exceptions:
(a) If the United States appeals from the sentence . . . .
(b) If (1) the sentence exceeds the applicable statutory limits set forth in
the United States Code, or (2) the sentence unreasonably exceeds the
guideline range determined by the Court under the Sentencing
3Guidelines. . . .
(Id. at 17-18.)  The agreement clarified that the “foregoing reservations of the right to
appeal on the basis of specified issues do not include the right to raise issues other than
those specified.”  (Id. at 18.)  Both Jones and his attorney signed the agreement.
Jones pled guilty on July 25, 2006.  The District Court conducted an extensive
colloquy of Jones to ascertain his understanding of the terms of the plea agreement,
including the waiver of appeal rights.  The District Court directed Jones’s attorney and
the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) to explain to Jones the consequences of
the appeal waiver and its narrow exceptions.  The District Court then asked Jones whether
he understood and agreed with the explanation, to which Jones – under oath subject to
penalty of perjury – responded affirmatively. 
On December 5, 2006, the District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing to
resolve the Government’s objection to the recommendation in the Presentence
Investigation Report that Jones receive only a two-level enhancement in his offense level
due to his leadership role in the drug trafficking conspiracy.  At the conclusion of the
evidentiary presentation, Jones objected to any enhancement in his offense level for his
role in the jointly-undertaken criminal activity.  Finding that the testimony showed Jones
to be the “central cog in this conspiracy,” (App. 108), the District Court sustained the
Government’s objection and overruled the defense objection.  The resultant four-level
enhancement for role in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) produced a net offense
4level of 35.  Combined with a criminal history category of VI, Jones’s offense level
resulted in an advisory guideline range of 292 to 365 months imprisonment.  After
hearing from Jones, his attorney, and the AUSA, the District Court imposed a prison term
at the bottom of the advisory guideline range, 292 months.  Despite the appeal waiver,
this timely appeal followed.
II
A.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  This Court retains jurisdiction over an
appeal even though the defendant has executed a plea agreement containing an appeal
waiver.  United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  If, however, we
find that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal, and that the
enforcement of the waiver will not work a miscarriage of justice, we refrain from
exercising our jurisdiction.  Id.  Our review of appeal waivers is de novo.  United States
v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001).
B.
In Khattak, this Court held that “[w]aivers of appeals, if entered into knowingly
and voluntarily, are valid, unless they work a miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 563.  The
defendant shoulders the burden of demonstrating why the waiver should not be enforced. 
Id.
5“In determining whether a waiver of appeal is ‘knowing and voluntary,’ the role of
the sentencing judge is critical.”  Id.  Thus, we examine the guilty plea colloquy
conducted by the District Court for its compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.  Before
accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, the District Court must address the defendant in open
court to “inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the
terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack
the sentence.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(n).
Here, the District Court clearly complied with this rule.  At Jones’s change of plea
hearing, the District Court asked Jones whether he read the plea agreement, discussed it
with his attorney, agreed with and understood its terms and conditions, and signed the
plea agreement.  Jones answered “yes” to each question.  The court paid particular
attention to the appeal waiver, directing Jones’s attorney and the AUSA to explain the
consequences of the waiver and confirming Jones’s understanding and agreement with
their explanation. 
Jones does not challenge the District Court’s compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(n).  Instead, Jones argues that the waiver is invalid because he did not know at
the time he agreed to waive his appeal rights that the District Court would “engage in
unconstitutional sentencing practices.”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.)  This contention is
baseless.  The District Court had no obligation to advise Jones of hypothetical sentences
in order to assure a knowing and voluntary waiver of appeal rights.  The District Court
6did, however, explain to Jones that his sentence could be more or less severe than that
anticipated by Jones or provided for by the guidelines, and that in such case Jones would
be bound by his guilty plea and likely unable to appeal the sentence.  Jones represented
that he understood this explanation.  Accordingly, we hold that Jones knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal.
Jones also contends that enforcement of the waiver will work a miscarriage of
justice.  In Khattak, this Court recognized that “[t]here may be an unusual circumstance
where an error amounting to a miscarriage of justice may invalidate the waiver.” 
Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562 (emphasis added).  We declined to delineate specific situations
where an appeal waiver may be unenforceable, but rather adopted the approach of United
States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001), which considers several factors before
relieving a defendant of his waiver: the clarity, gravity, and character of the error; the
error’s impact on the parties; and the extent of the defendant’s acquiescence in the result. 
Id. at 563 (quoting Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25-26); see also United States v. Shedrick, 493
F.3d 292, 298 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this matter, Jones fails to identify, and our review of the record does not reveal,
any error committed by the District Court that, if left unchecked, would work a
miscarriage of justice.  In this regard, Jones’s claims of constitutional error are without
merit.  For instance, contrary to Jones’s arguments, the standard of proof for factual
findings relevant to the application of the advisory sentencing guidelines is
7preponderance of the evidence, and the maximum sentence for purposes of the right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an advisory sentencing guidelines scheme is that
prescribed by the United States Code.  See United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561, 565,
568 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  The District Court adhered to these constitutional
requirements in imposing its sentence in this case.  Furthermore, we observe that the
District Court, after considering the arguments of the parties and the relevant factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sentenced Jones to a prison term of 292 months, the bottom
of his advisory guideline range.  Thus, we discern no injustice that would warrant
relieving Jones of his waiver of the right to appeal.  Consequently, we will enforce the
waiver, decline to review the substantive issues presented by Jones’s appeal, and affirm
the District Court.
III
For the reasons stated, we affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.
